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DE PAUL LAW kEVIEW
vails in this state, which is in accord with the majority view; that it is not only
sound, but that if such comment were to be permitted, it would, in effect, amount
to an infringement of the constitutional right of the accused to abstain from
taking the witness stand or to give testimony in the trial of his own cause....
We are fortified in this view by the fact that in those states where comment
obtains, experience has shown the defendant is, in fact, pressed to testify....
Allowing comment would indeed make the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination an idle gesture, for everyone accused of crime would be faced
with the dilemma of being forced to either take the stand in his own defense or
have an inference of guilt attach merely because he does not do so. s5
CONCLUSION
It would appear that all the arguments favoring the right of comment
may be distilled into one major proposition, viz., a greater amount of truth
will be obtained in criminal proceedings. This will occur because the pos-
sible effect of comment will cause more defendants to testify, and there-
fore direct evidence will be obtained for the court.
While it is true that the obtaining of direct evidence would aid in pro-
ducing a just result, the fact remains that such a desirable end tends to
reduce the effectiveness of the constitutional privilege against self-in-
crimination since the accused will usually testify out of fear of the prose-
cution's right to comment on his failure to testify.
Therefore, although the choice is technically a voluntary one on be-
half of the accused, in a real sense he is being forced to testify, which is
the exact right which the self-incrimination amendments are designed to
protect. The all-important question, then, is whether the increased obtain-
ment of direct evidence is a great enough benefit to pay for the cost of re-
ducing a constitutional right.
-95 State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893, 54 So. 2d 137, 141, 142 (1951).
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO POLL THE JURY
IN CRIMINAL CASES
Polling the jury-the practice whereby the jurors are asked individually
the findings they have reached, thus creating individual responsibility and
eliminating any uncertainty as to the verdict announced by the foreman'
-is designed to afford the members of the jury an opportunity for free
expression before the court, unhampered by the fears or the errors which
may have attended their private deliberations. 2 A survey of the extent to
which this right exists, if at all, comprises the subject matter of this com-
ment.
Little did Sir Matthew Hale realize, in writing his History of the Pleas
of the Crovm, the extent of the divergence subsequent judicial interpreta-
' State v. Cleveland, 6 N.J. 316, 78 A. 2d 560 (1951).
28 Wigmore on Evidence § 2355 (1940).
COMMENTS
tion was to accord his choice of but one word. In writing, "now touching
the giving up of their verdict, if the jury say they are agreed, the court
may examine them by poll, and if in truth they are not agreed, they are
finable," s he provided the foundation for threee separate and distinct
theories with regard to polling the jury upon the defendant's request,
namely, (I) no such right exists; (2) whether or not a poll will be granted
is solely within the discretion ofthe court; and (3) the defendant has an
absolute legal right to do so.
THEORIES
The rule adopted in three New England states declares that the de-
fendant has no right to poll the jury.4 In Commonwealth v Costley5 the
court said: "In Massachusetts, it has never been the right of a party, in
any case, civil or criminal, to have the jury polled." In State v Hoyt,6 in
affirming a refusal to grant the defendant's request for a poll of the jury,
the Connecticut court declared: "Such a right, under the law and practice
of this state, has never been recognized, and there are no considerations
of justice, expediency, or security to the prisoner, that require its adop-
tion instead of our present practice." Justification for this position is
found in the practice prevalent in these jurisdications whereby the entire
panel is asked whether or not they assent to the verdict, which purport-
edly is substantially equivalent to a poll of the jury.7
Other jurisdictions, adopting a more literal interpretation of Hale's
choice of words, permit the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discre-
tion, to grant the defendant's request for a poll of the jury.8 Typically,
this result is reached without the aid of any statute, as illusrated by Ryan
v. People, wherein the court remarked:
We have no statute on this subject. The right, if any, which exists respecting
the poll of the jury is from the common law. That the right is absolute may be
well doubted. What little authority we have upon the subject rather points to the
fact that at common law the matter was in the discretion of the court and for it
to exercise if, for any reason, upon return of a verdict there appeared a doubt as
to its entire unanimity.9
3 2 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. ed., Stokes and Ingersall, 1847)
at 299 (italics added).
4 State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 36 Am. Rep. 89 (1880); Commonwealth v. Costley, 118
Mass. 1 (1875); Fellow's Case, 5 Me. 333 (1828).
5 118 Mass. 1 (1875).
647 Conn. 518, 36 Am. Rep. 89 (1880).
7 Authorities cited note 4 supra.
8 State v. Grierson, 96 N.H. 36, 69 A. 2d 851 (1949); State v. Simon, 126 S.C. 437, 120
S.E. 230 (1923); State v. Sousa, 43 R.I. 176, 110 At. 603 (1920); Ryan v. People, 50 Colo.
99, 114 Pac. 306 (1911).
9 50 Colo. 99, 114 Pac. 306 (1911).
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Circumstances properly motivating the court to exercise its discretion so
as to grant the defendant's request for a poll of the jury have included
those where there exists some doubt as to the unanimity of the agree-
ment upon the verdict'0 or upon a showing of some other reason or justi-
fication for the polling."
The third view-which represents the great weight of authority among
the courts that have litigated the question-permits the defendant, irre-
spective of an statute, to demand as a matter of legal right a poll of the
jury after a guilty verdict. 2 This right is considered absolute in felony
cases,' 8 and has frequently been applied, and expressly declared applica-
ble, in misdemeanor cases as well;14 moreover, the defendant has this
right whether it be an oral or a sealed verdict.' 5 It should be noted, in
addition, that in those jurisdictions according the defendant an absolute
right to poll the jury, there is authority for granting a similar right to the
prosecution. 16
10 Ryan v. People, 50 Colo. 99, 114 Pac. 306 (1911).
11 State v. Wise, 41 S.C.L. 412 (7 Rich, 1854).
12 State v. Schmelz, 17 N.J. 227, 11 A. 2d 50 (1955); State v. Brooks, 59 N.M. 130, 279
P. 2d 1048 (1955); State v. Cephus, 241 N.C. 562, 86 S.E. 2d 70 (1955); Allen v. State,
260 Ala. 324, 70 So. 2d 644 (1954); Carver v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 2d 375 (Ky.,
1953); England v. State, 196 Tenn. 186, 264 S.W. 2d 815 (1953); State v. Thursby, 245
S.W. 2d 859 (Mo., 1952); Gilmore v. State, 229 Ind. 359, 98 N.E. 2d 677 (1951); State v.
Ritchie, 172 La. 942, 136 So. 11 (1931); Webb v. State, 166 Ga. 218, 142 S.E. 898 (1928);
Commonwealth v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26, 140 AtI. 611 (1927); Watts v. Commonwealth,
129 Va. 781, 106 S.E. 339 (1921); Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N.W. 209 (1921);
Roney v. United States, 43 App. D.C. 533 (1915); State v. Gorman, 113 Minn. 401, 129
N.W. 589 (1911); Wingfield v. State, 95 Ark. 71, 128 S.W. 562 (1910); Cable v. State,
38 So. 98 (Miss., 1905); Hommer v. State, 85 Md. 562, 37 Atl. 26 (1897); Summeralls v.
State, 37 Fla. 162, 20 So. 242 (1896); Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63, 9 Am. Rep. 78
(1871); Rose v. State, 20 Ohio 31 (1851); Harriman v. State, 2 Greene 270 (Ia., 1849);
People v. Perkins, 1 Wend. 91 (N.Y., 1928); Nomaque v. People, 1 111. 145 (1825), rev'd
on other grounds in People ex rel. Merrill v. Hazard, 361 Ill. 60, 196 N.E. 827 (1935).
13 Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 Pa. D. and C. 488 (1931).
14 Stewart v. State, 147 Ala. 137, 41 So. 631 (1906).
15 State v. Young. 77 N.C. 498 (1877), where the court said: "We think a defendant
on trial in a criminal case .... has the right to have the jury polled, whether it be oral
or a sealed verdict. He has no right to say in what manner it shall be done, nor to pro-
pound any question, but simply to know that the verdict given by the foreman is the
verdict of each juror, and we think it is error in the court to deny it when demanded."
Many jurisdictions, however, permit sealed verdicts in misdemeanor cases only; see, e.g.,
I11. Rev. Stat. (1929) c. 38, sec. 745, which declares: ".... [P]rovided, in cases of misde-
meanor only, if the prosecutor for the people and the person on trial, by himself or
counsel, shall agree, which agreement shall be entered upon the minutes of the court,
to dispense with attendance of an officer upon the jury, or that the jury when they
have agreed upon their verdict, may write and seal the same, and after delivering the
same to the clerk, may separate, it shall be lawful for the court to carry into effect any
such agreement and receive any such verdict so delivered to the clerk, as the lawful
verdict of such jury."
1' Feddern v. State, 79 Neb. 641, 113 N.W. 127 (1907); Cowart v. State, 147 Ala. 137,
41 So.631 (1906).
COM!MENTS
Illinois, assuming continued adherence to a remarkably uncontroversial
1825 decision in Nomaque v. People,1" must be included among those
jurisdiction that regard the defendant's right to poll the jury an inviolate
one. In holding that a prisoner has the right to have the jury present in
court when they deliver their verdict in order that they may be polled, the
court relied on prior civil cases, justifying its holding on the theory that
it certainly was of no less importance to grant a similar right to a de-
fendant in a criminal case. This theoretical justification is difficult to un-
dermine; in addition, this position presents no cumbersome procedural
problems regarding a poll of the jury so as to require revision-conse-
quently, an abrupt change in attitude seems highly unlikely.
To dispel any confusion which may exist in their courts, and to pro-
mulgate an affirmative policy, many jurisdictions have enacted legislation
regarding the defendant's right to poll the jury; 8 typically, they permit
the jury to be polled at the instance of either party,'9 which right is re-
garded as a substantial one and an integral part of trial by jury.20
RESTRICTIONS
Even in the jurisdictions regarding a poll of the jury a matter of right-
whether by interpretation of the common law or by statute-and clearly
in the jurisdictions regarding such a right as merely discretionary, the
court is not bound to poll the jury unless the defendant requests, at the
proper time, that it do so.21 Requests which have been held timely include
those made (1) after the verdict is announced and prior to its filing;22
17 1 Il. 145 (1825), rev'd on other grounds in People ex rel. Merrill v. Hazard, 361
I1. 60, 196 N.E. 827 (1935).
18 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) S 43-2160; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 44-1912; Cal. Penal
Code (Deering, 1941) § 1163; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) 919.10; Ida. Code Ann. (1946) § 19-
2316; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 9-1811; Ia. Code Ann. (1946) § 785.15; Ky. Crim.
Code of Prac. (Carroll, 1948) § 267; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) § 15.416; Minn. Stat. Ann.
(1943) S 631.16; Mont. Rev. Code (1947) § 94.7416; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 29-2, 24;
Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 11021; N.Y. Penal Code (McKinney) § 450; N.D. Rev. Code
(1943) § 29-2213; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1948) § 13448.5; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1936)
22.921; Ore. Star. (1941) c. 22, § 921; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (1925) Art. 691; Utah
Code Ann. (1953) §§ 77, 33-10; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) S 10-1401. See also Fed. Rules
Crim. Proc. 31(d).
19 Contra: Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) § 9-1811, which apparently limits the right
to poll to the defendant only.
2 0 Mackett v. United States, 90 F. 2d 462 (1937); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky.
709, 215 S.W. 2d 838 (1948); State v. Callahan, 55 Ia. 364, 7 N.W. 603 (1880).
21 State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 98 A. 2d 299 (1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 900 (1953);
State v. Boger, 202 N.C. 702, 162 S.E. 877 (1932); State v. Simon, 123 S.C. 437, 120 S.E.
230 (1923).
22 State v. Cleveland, 6 N.J. 316, 78 A. 2d 560 (1951); State v. Lewis, 59 Nev. 262, 91
P. 2d 820 (1939).
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(2) prior to the separation or discharge of the jury; 23 and (3) prior to
the pronouncement of sentence.24 A request that the jury be polled when
they first report that they cannot agree on a verdict has been held to be
premature. 25
Failure to make a timely request for a poll of the jury, where a reason-
able opportunity to do so has been afforded the defendant, is generally
held to constitute a waiver of the right.26 The defendant's consent to the
separation of the jury prior to the rendition of the verdict,27 and the vol-
untary absence of the defendant or his counsel from the courtroom at
the time the verdict is delivered, 2 similarly may give rise to a waiver
under some circumstances. This is true in spite of statements to the effect
that a waiver of the right to poll should never be implied.29
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, having observed the three different interpretations ac-
corded Hale's statement regarding the defendant's right to poll the jury,
it seems inescapable that the position adopted by the vast majority of
American courts-that the defendant's right to poll the jury, if properly
made, is absolute-is in greater harmony with our traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice; much more so, in any event, than the
rules considering this right as merely discretionary or denying it entirely.
It is submitted for the reader's consideration, however, that perhaps our
traditional notions, as propounded by judges and legislators, are steeped
in precedent rather than reason so as to afford the criminally accused an
unwarranted and unreasonable measure of protection; for in application,
a poll of the jury is requested by the defendant only as a final effort, as
a last resort in the hope of a mistrial resulting from a possible defection
among the jury because of the public declaration required.
2 3 Budges v. State, 154 Miss. 489, 122 So. 533 (1929); Hammond v. State, 166 Ga. 213,
142 S.E. 895 (1928); Joy v. State, 14 Ind. 139 (1860).
24 Webb v. State, 166 Ga. 218, 142 S.E. 898 (1928).
25 Cable v. State, 38 So. 98 (Miss., 1905).
26 State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 98 A. 2d 299 (1953); England v. State, 196 Tenn. 186,
264 S.W. 2d 815 (1953); United States v. Dye, 61 Fed. Supp. 457 (D.C. Ky., 1945).
27 Vaughan v. State, 9 Ga. App. 613, 71 S.E. 945 (1911).
28 Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N.W. 209 (1922); State v. Waymire, 52 Ore.
281, 97 Pac. 46 (1908); Hommer v. State, 85 Md. 562, 37 Atd. 26 (1897).
29 Carver v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 2d 375 (Ky., 1953); W¥ooten v. State, 19 Ga.
App. 739, 92 S.E. 233 (1917), where the court said: "The right to poll the jury should
never be denied where the right is exercised in time. This right is always exercised in
time when demanded after the verdict is published and before the jury is dispersed and
before sentence. A waiver of the right should never be implied."
